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I. INTRODUCTION
Nations around the world are responding to terrorism with a combination of law
enforcement measures and military action.1 In the United States, for example, the federal
government has prosecuted terrorists responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,2 the
1998 assaults on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,3 and the attacks of September 11,
2001.4 At the same time, the government also has been using its armed forces against al-Qaida
terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, and other places.5 Other countries fighting
terrorism with both criminal proceedings and military actions include Egypt,6 Israel,7 Russia,8

1

For a general treatment of law enforcement, military, and other governmental responses
to terrorism, see GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2005).
2

See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1112
(1999) (prosecution of terrorists who detonated a van full of explosives under one of the towers
of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six, injuring 1400 others, and caused over
$500 million of property damages).
3

See United States v. Bin Laden, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, No. S(7), 98 Cr. 1023
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2001), available at <available at <http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-78.htm>
(sentencing of terrorists who participated in the bombing of the American Embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding thousands of others).
4

The United States currently is prosecuting Zacarias Moussaoui, whom it accuses of
having conspired with the hijackers involved in the attacks. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382
F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1670 (2005).
5

Complete official news on the United States' military campaign against terrorism is
available at <http://www.defendamerica.mil>. Discussion of several of military responses
appears in part II below.
6

See Susan Sachs, A Nation Challenged: Bin Laden's Allies; An Investigation in Egypt
Illustrates Al Qaeda's Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at A1 (describing major anti-terrorism
2

Turkey,9 and the United Kingdom.10
When governments use military force to respond to terrorism, a debate often arises about
the legality of the steps taken. As this article will show with numerous examples, the debate has
familiar contours. Opponents of the governmental action typically argue that it violates legal
guarantees designed to protect criminal suspects. They assert, for instance, that domestic and
international laws do not permit the government simply to shoot suspected terrorists, or to detain
them indefinitely, or to try them outside of ordinary courts.
But governments and their supporters have a standard reply to this objection. They assert
that they are not merely addressing crime, but instead are fighting a war, and that the law
applicable to armed conflict allows them to employ the measures that they have used. In the
United States, the familiar refrain is: "We took these kinds of actions in World War II when we

prosecutions in Egypt); Associated Press, Egypt Sentences 6 To Death for Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1996, at 12 (describing military process used against suspected terrorists).
7

See Uri Dan, Israel Blows Away 2 Top Terrorists, N.Y. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at 30
(describing targeted killing of suspected terrorists; Charles A. Radin, Palestinian Leader
Convicted in Israel Five Life Terms Sought in Killings, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2004, at A8
(describing prosecution of terrorists in Israel).
8

See Nadezhda Gaisenok & Alexander Shashkov, Russia Court to Examine Appeal of 3
Chechens Convicted for Terror, TASS, Nov. 9, 2005 (discussing criminal prosecution of terrorists
in Russia); David Holley, Separatists Tied to '99 Bombings, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2003, at 5
(discussion Russian military responses to terrorist bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow).
9

See Andrew Finkel, A Foregone Conviction; the Trial of Kurdish Leader Abdullah
Ocalan Is Set to Begin in Turkey amid Questions of Fairness, TIME, Jun. 7, 1999, at 39; Sam
Cohen, Turkey's Military Rulers Post a Sharp Decline in Terrorism, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Nov. 25, 1980, at 6 (addressing Turkey's military responses to terrorism).
10

See David Leppard & Richard Woods, Britain's Secret War on Terror, SUNDAY TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2005, at 16 (describing the use of trials to combat terrorism); Brian Lavery, Britain to
Halve its Forces in Ulster, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 3, 2005, at 3 (describing British military
responses to terrorism in Northern Ireland).
3

were fighting the Nazis and the Japanese, and therefore we can take them in the war that we are
fighting against al-Qaida."11
So at present the debate often boils down to a question of which law governs
governmental responses to terrorism. Is it the law that regulates law enforcement actions? Or is
it the law of armed conflict? The choice matters. Those who believe that the rules that apply to
law enforcement actions must govern responses to terrorism consider many of the responses that
governments actually have taken to be illegal. And those who believe that the law of armed
conflict applies tend to think that they fall wholly within accepted standards of war fighting.
Take the issue of targeted killing. A country engages in targeted killing when it locates
and summarily kills a suspected terrorist. The United States has engaged in the practice in its
struggle against terrorism. For example, the CIA has fired missiles at suspected members of alQaida, without trying to bring them into custody.12 Israel also has done targeted killing,
attacking Palestinians in the West Bank, Syria, and other places.13 And Russia reportedly once
sent a poisonous letter to kill a Chechen leader.14

11

See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Fanatics in Court, SUN-SENTINEL, Jul. 26, 2002, at 31A
("We never threw open our courtroom doors to captured Nazi prisoners of war in World War II,
much less gave them access to our press.").
12

See Reuters, Rights Group Questions Attack; Amnesty Says U.S. Missile Strike in
Yemen May be Illegal, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2002 at A21 (describing an incident in which the
CIA killed persons suspected of participating in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole). For further
discussion, see part II.C. infra.
13

See Joel Greenberg, Palestinian Militant Slain in Damascus; Israel Blamed; Revenge
Vowed, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 27, 2004, at 3 (describing Israel's practice of targeted killing).
14

See Peter Baker, Russia Moving to Eliminate Chechen Rebel Leaders, WASH. POST,
Apr. 20, 2004, at A13 (reporting that Russia reported killa guerrilla called "Khattab" in 2002
with a poisoned letter).
4

Is the targeted killing of suspected terrorists lawful? As explained more fully below,15
everyone agrees that ordinary law enforcement rules in the United States (and in most other
places) do not permit the police simply to kill criminal suspects. Instead, they must give them a
chance to surrender before attacking them. In contrast, long established principles of the law of
war say that military forces generally may target and kill enemy forces in the course of a lawful
armed conflict, wherever they find them and without giving them a chance to surrender, unless
they already have laid down their weapons and given themselves up.
But what do these two sets of rules say about the targeted killing of suspected terrorists?
At present, the answer appears to depend on which of the two sets of rules apply. Opponents of
targeted killing might view suspected terrorists as criminal suspects, concluding that the
government cannot simply target and kill them. Meanwhile, proponents of targeted killing by
military forces might consider the suspected terrorists to have the status of enemy combatants. If
the two sides disagree on the proper characterization of the suspected terrorists, they will reach
conflicting views about which set of legal rules should apply. In turn, they will arrive at
different conclusions about the legality of any targeted killing.
Reacting to this familiar pattern of argumentation, this article considers in depth the
dichotomous characterization of governmental responses to terrorism as either law enforcement
measures against criminal suspects or exercises of armed force against enemy combatants. The
article makes three specific claims, elaborated in parts II, III, and IV respectively. First, the need
to characterize governmental actions to determine their legality is now and long has been a
central feature of anti-terrorism law. A requirement of dichotomous characterization arises in no

15

See infra part II.B. (describing legal rules that may apply to targeted killing).
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fewer than eight different subject areas, ranging from targeted killing to the responsibility of the
government to provide compensation. Characterization issues further have arisen not only in the
United States but also in many foreign countries. And disputes over characterization are not
new; they have occurred for many decades.
Second, determining the legality of governmental responses to terrorism by attempting to
characterize terrorists as either criminal suspects or as enemy combatants is not a good system.
Terrorists generally defy simple characterization because they resemble enemy combatants in
some ways and criminal suspects in others. In addition, the different subject areas in which the
issue of characterization arises vary from each other in so many respects that a characterization
that make sense in one area does not necessarily make sense in another. In fact, as the article
will show, the United States has found itself hard pressed to take a consistent view on
characterization, despite the centrality of the question.
Third, the law would be improved by moving to a system that does not rely so heavily on
dichotomous characterization. The United States and other nations ought to create specialized
laws to regulate governmental responses to terrorism, rather than debating whether the laws of
war or the rules of law enforcement should apply. These laws would see terrorism as a problem
that sometimes lies between traditional crime and traditional warfare, and establish rules
designed to address governmental responses to it. Already examples of some of this kind of
legislation are emerging in the United Kingdom.

II. THE DOMINANCE OF DICHOTOMOUS CHARACTERIZATION
The following discussion will show that the need to characterize terrorists as either

6

criminals or enemy combatants is now, and long has been, a central feature of the law regulating
governmental responses to terrorism.16 This feature affects many different subject areas. It is
present in domestic, foreign, and international law. And it has persisted for a long time.

A. Authority to Use Force in Foreign Countries
May a nation lawfully respond to a terrorist incident by using military force in a foreign
country? This question often has great importance. Terrorist organizations sometimes have
foreign bases of operation. In addition, after committing their assaults, terrorists often flee
across borders. For these reasons, the United States and other nations may wish to make
counterattacks abroad.The U.N. Charter generally forbids nations to use military force in foreign
countries. Article 2(4) says: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."17 But the U.N. Charter
has an exception in article 51 recognizing that nations have a right to use force when responding
in self-defense to an "armed attack."18
So the precise legal issue is this: If a nation responds to a terrorist incident by using
military force in a foreign country, does that violate the U.N. Charter? If the terrorist incident

16

The discussion makes no claims about which side of the debate has the better argument
as matter of policy or which side should win in the courts.
17

Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art. 2(4), 1 UNTS 16 [hereinafter "U.N. Charter"].

18

Id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
7

was an "armed attack" within the meaning of article 51, then the response may be lawful. But if
the terrorist incident was not an "armed attack," but instead merely a crime, then the response
would violate the prohibition in article 2(4).
In past instances, national governments and international organizations have drawn
conflicting conclusions on the very basic question of whether terrorists are just criminals or
whether they are forces capable of mounting an "armed attacked." As a result, observers have
different views about the lawfulness of extra-territorial military responses to terrorism. Here are
several prominent examples:
Example # 1: In 2004, at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, the
International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the legality of a lengthy fence
constructed by Israel.19 Israel built the fence to block terrorists from entering Israel.20 The fence
partially followed Israel's internationally recognized borders, but in some places it also ran
through the occupied territory of the West Bank.21
The International Court of Justice considered, among other issues, whether article 51
could excuse Israel's use of force (i.e., the building of the fence) outside of its borders as a
measure taken in self-defense.22 The court concluded that it could not, giving two alternative

security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council . . . .").
19

See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2003 I.C.J. No. 131 (advisory opinion of Jul. 9, 2004).
20

See id. ¶ 116.

21

See id. ¶ 122.

22

See id. ¶ 138. Israel did not press a substantive argument before the court. It contended
that General Assembly had acted in an ultra vires manner in seeking an advisory opinion because
8

reasons. First, the court said that "Article 51 of the Charter . . . recognizes the existence of an
inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State" and
that "Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State."23 Second,
the court said that the threat originated from territory that Israel controls, and that Article 51
therefore does not apply.24
In other words, the court concluded that Israel cannot use force but must instead use
ordinary law enforcement measures to deal with the terrorist threat.25 Praising the decision,
Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell has written: "the situation Israel faced at the time of the
Advisory Opinion was more akin to terrorist attacks perpetrated by the state's own nationals
within the state's own territory because of the measure of control Israel exercises over the
occupied territories. Terrorist attacks by nationals within their own state have invariably been
treated as criminal. . . ."26
But not everyone agrees with this position. Judge Burgenthal of the International Court
of Justice filed a separate declaration in the case. Although he principally asserted that the court

the Security Council was actively addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See id. ¶ 24. In
addition, because the General Assembly was seeking an advisory opinion, and had not named
Israel as party to the lawsuit, Israel had no duty to make a substance argument. See id.
(declaration of Judge Burgenthal), at ¶ 10. But the Court noted that Israel previously had told the
United Nations General Assembly that it was constructing the fence in self-defense. Israel cited
Security Council Resolution No. 1368 to support its argument. See id. ¶ 138.
23

Id. ¶ 139.

24

See id.

25

See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-state Actors through a Global
War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 451 (2005).
26

Id.
9

should not have exercised jurisdiction,27 he also specifically disagreed with the court's reasons
for rejecting Israel's self-defense argument. He asserted that the U.N. charter does not permit
self-defense only against armed attacks from other nations and that it was "irrelevant" whether
Israel controlled the occupied territories.28 In his view, in assessing Israel's position under article
51, the court should have judged Israel's actions by their "necessity and proportionality."29 In
other words, Judge Burgenthal did not think that nations could only use criminal law
enforcement measures against terrorist acts.
Example # 2: On September 11, 2001, members of al-Qaida infamously hijacked and
crashed four aircraft in the United States. The United States responded by using military force
against al-Qaida in Afghanistan. In pursuing this action, the United States took the position that
it was fighting a war and could do what the laws applicable to armed conflict allow. The United
States informed the United Nations Security Council, as article 51 requires, that it was acting in
self-defense in response to an "armed attack."30 The United States also persuaded NATO to
agree to this characterization of the terrorist attacks.31

27

See 2003 I.C.J. No. 131 (declaration of Judge Burgenthal) at ¶ 1.

28

See id. ¶ 6.

29

Id.

30

See U.N. Charter, supra note 17, art. 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . .").
31

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson, available at <www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm> ("[I]t has now been
determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad
and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all.").
10

But not all observers share the United States and NATO's view. The Security Council
itself never specifically called the terrorist incidents an "armed attack." Instead, it issued a
diplomatically worded statement both condemning the assaults and "[r]ecognizing the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter."32 The statement
did not specifically say that the Charter authorized the use of force by the United States.33
Professor Sean Murphy has offered an explanation for why some might consider the
events of September 11th not to rise to the level of an armed attack.34 Murphy notes that the
terrorists did not operate as military or paramilitary units and that they were armed only with box
cutters--"not weapons one would normally associate with military or paramilitary units."35
Although he does not endorse the position, he raises the question whether "this was not an 'armed
attack' but, rather, a use of force or intervention below the threshold of armed attack, which is
perhaps better characterized as a conventional (albeit heinous) criminal act."36
Example #3: In 1998, following attacks by al-Qaida on U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, the United States responded by firing missiles at suspected al-Qaida targets in Sudan

32

S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001).

33

See id.

34

See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41 (2002).
35

Id. at 45.

36

Id. at 46.
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and Afghanistan.37 The United States informed the Security Council, again as article 51
requires, that it was acting in self-defense to an armed attack.38
But others disagree with this characterization of the bombings. Sudan has protested the
action.39 And some scholars have judged the United States in law enforcement terms; Professor
Jules Lobel says: "It is self-serving hypocrisy for the United States to attack alleged terrorist
facilities, violate other nations' sovereignty, and kill innocent civilians, using evidence that
would not suffice to sustain a criminal prosecution."40
Other extra-territorial uses of military force to respond to terrorist attacks have led to
similar debates about the applicability of article 51. The United Nations General Assembly
condemned the United States' 1986 strike on Libya in response to a nightclub bombing in
Berlin.41 And the Security Council (with the United States abstaining) condemned Israel's 1985

37

See El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005) (discussing these attacks).
38

The second sentence of article 51 requires a nation exercising self-defense to notify the
security council. See U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . ."). The United
States fulfilled this requirement by sending a letter describing the reasons for the attacks in
Sudan and Afghanistan. See Letter from Bill Richardson, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, to Danilo Turk, President, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc S/1998/780 (Aug
20, 1998).
39

See Craig Turner, Sudan Gets Little Support for a U.N. Probe of U.S. Attack, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, at A6.
40

See Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of
Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 551 (1999).
41

The United States viewed the terrorist incident was an armed attack, and that it
therefore concluded that it could use military force in self-defense under article 51. But the
United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution that "[c]ondemns the military attack
perpetrated against the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 15 April 1986, which
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bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters near Tunis in response
to an attack on a Tunisian synagogue.42 In each of these many incidents, observers disagreed
about the legality of a government response to terrorism because they disagreed about whether to
characterize it as a response to crime or an act taken in an armed conflict.

B. Authority to Use Force Domestically
Is it lawful for a nation to use military force domestically in response to terrorism? The
laws of each country will provide a different answer. But again the answer generally turns on
whether the perpetrators are characterized as criminal suspects or as enemy combatants. Usually
there are two bodies of law, one for law enforcement and one for armed conflicts, and
governmental responses to terrorism must be pigeon-holed into one or the other whenever a legal
dispute arises. In the United States, as in other countries, federal law limits the domestic use of
military forces. The Posse Comitatus Act, in particular, makes it a crime for any government
official to use the Armed Forces for law enforcement purposes.43 The historic purpose of the Act

constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law . . . ." G.A.
Res. 38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 78th plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986).
42

Israel asserted that it was acting in self-defense in response to an armed attack as
permitted under article 51. But the Security Council (with the United States abstaining) passed a
resolution saying that it "[c]ondemns vigorously the act of armed aggression perpetrated by
Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations
International Law and norms of conduct . . . ." S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 2615th meeting, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/573 (1985).
43

The Posse Comitatus Act says: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army
or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1385. A "posse comitatus" is
a "group of citizens who are called together to assist the sheriff in keeping the peace." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 8th ed. 1999).
13

was to end the use of federal troops in the former areas of the Confederacy after the Civil War."44
But the law has modern justifications as well. The Act preserves federalism by making state and
local governments responsible for most law enforcement. It also guards against the possibility
that armed forces not specifically trained for law enforcement activities do not violate the civil
liberties of citizens.
But is responding to terrorism a law enforcement measure or a military action? Two
recent incidents have raised this question. One involves an American citizen named Jose Padilla.
According to stipulated facts:
Padilla . . . associated with forces hostile to the United States in Afghanistan and
took up arms against United States forces in that country in our war against al
Qaeda. Upon his escape to Pakistan from the battlefield in Afghanistan, Padilla
was recruited, trained, funded, and equipped by al Qaeda leaders to continue
prosecution of the war in the United States by blowing up apartment buildings in
this country. Padilla flew to the United States on May 8, 2002, to begin carrying
out his assignment . . . .45
Federal agents took Padilla into custody at Chicago's O'Hare airport.46 They initially held him as
a material witness to a grand jury proceeding.47 But the President later designated him an

44

Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied 336 U.S. 918

45

Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 386 (4th Cir. 2005), , cert. pet'n filed Oct. 25, 2005.

46

See id.

47

See id. at 390.

(1949).
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"enemy combatant."48 Afterward, with the blessing of the federal courts, the United States
military has held Padilla in a naval brig.49
In extensive and ongoing litigation, the federal courts have considered a number of issues
regarding Padilla's confinement.50 Padilla at one point challenged his custody as a violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act.51 He alleged that military forces were aiding law enforcement by
detaining him. But the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York did
not see Padilla's detention as a law enforcement matter. It said:
Padilla is not being detained by the military in order to execute a civilian law or
for violating a civilian law, notwithstanding that his alleged conduct may in fact
violate one or more such laws. He is being detained in order to interrogate him
about the unlawful organization with which he is said to be affiliated and with
which the military is in active combat, and to prevent him from becoming
reaffiliated with that organization.52
The court therefore found no violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Again, characterization
determined which legal regime applied to the governmental action.
The second incident involved a pair of snipers who terrorized the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia in 2002. John Muhammad and Lee Malvo drove through suburban
areas, with one or both of them shooting people at random through a hole they had made in the

48

See id. at 388.

49

See id. at 390.

50

See id. at 397 (upholding Padilla's confinement).

51

See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.2d 564, 588 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 595 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd on
other grounds, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
52

Id.
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trunk of their car.53 The attacks went on for weeks, with 11 persons shot and thousands terrified.
Muhammad and Malvo never made their aims fully clear, although they did ask for money at one
point.54
In an effort to apprehend the snipers, the FBI requested assistance from the Department
of Defense.55 The Department of Defense responded by providing an Army surveillance
airplane.56 The aircraft had the ability to cover a large area and to use special electronic
equipment to detect the heat and sound of small arms fire, possibly including shots fired by the
snipers from their rifle.57 If the Department of Defense could provide instantaneous information
about the location of gun shots across the area, the FBI hoped that it could locate and apprehend
the snipers.58

53

See Adam Liptak, Teenage Sniper to Plead Guilty in Two Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2004, at A10.
54

See Carol Morello, Victims’ Relatives Still Ask, “Why?”; Snipers’ Motives Remain
Unresolved, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2004, at A11.
55

DoD News Briefing, Sec'y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, Oct.
17, 2002, available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t10172002_t1017sd.html>
[hereinafter DoD Sniper Briefing].
56

See Tom Bowman et al., Spy Planes to Hunt Sniper, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 16, 2002, at

1A.
57

See Steve Vogel, Military Aircraft With Detection Gear To Augment Police, WASH.
POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at A1.
58

See id.
16

Critics argued that the surveillance activity violated the Posse Comitatus Act because it
was a form of military assistance to law enforcement.59 But others disagreed; some supporters of
the plan said that the Posse Comitatus Act does not prevent the military from engaging in
"passive" support to law enforcement.60 When asked at a Press Conference about the legality of
the Army's assistance to the FBI, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld simply said: "We have
looked at our assets and capabilities and tried to determine what we might do to be of assistance
to them that's consistent with the law, the Posse Comitatus law. . . . We do know that what we're
doing is fully consistent with the law, full stop."61 Secretary Rumsfeld also likened the action to
"combat air patrols flying, looking for airplanes that might crash into the White House or the
Capitol or the Pentagon or the World Trade Center."62 He said that military forces can prevent a
"bad act" and "it's not quite law enforcement."63
Thus, again, rather than attempting to view military responses to terrorism as a separate
category, and to determine what rules should apply to that category, the disputants contested
whether the responses should be viewed either as a law enforcement measure or as military
actions taken in an armed conflict.

59

See Fred Kaplan & Lyle Denniston, Army Plane Joins Sniper Hunt: Some Question Use
of Surveillance Craft, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2002, at A1; Adam Clymer, Big Brother Joins
Hunt for the Sniper, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, § 4, at 3...
60

See Kaplan, supra note 57, at A1.

61

DoD Sniper Briefing, supra note 53.

62

Id.

63

id.
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The United States is not alone in debating this kind of issue. In 1995, the Russian
Constitutional Court had to decide whether Russia's constitution banned the use of military
forces against Chechen rebels.64 The Russian Federation was using military force pursuant to
decrees issued by President Yeltsin and pursuant to resolutions of the Sate Duma (which is the
lower house of Russia's bicameral parliament).65 The Federation Council of the Russian
Federation (which is the upper chamber of the parliament) and other plaintiffs challenged this
domestic use of military force in the Russian Constitutional Court.66
The Federation Council argued that the use of armed forces in Russia's territory under
Russia's constitution is only permitted if the Federal Council declares a state of emergency or
martial law.67 In other words, the Federation Council argued that military measures could not be
used because there was no recognized armed conflict. Presumably, the Federation Council
believed that the Russian government could use only conventional law enforcement techniques
to address the situation. But the Constitutional Court upheld the use of force.68 It rejected the
idea that only law enforcement agencies could respond to the crisis. The court noted that the
Duma had concluded that "the disarmament of the unlawful armed militia raised in that republic,
which were using tanks, missile launchers, artillery systems and war planes, 'was impossible in
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principle without the use of regular troops.'"69 The court thus saw the situation more like an
armed conflict.
Once again, what neither side in the dispute considered was the possibility that terrorism
might fall into a separate category. They appeared to view the question simply as whether
terrorism amounted to an armed conflict or instead was just a matter for criminal law
enforcement. They did not recognize the possibility that terrorism may lie somewhere in
between war and crime, and that separate rules should determine the permissibility of using
military force.

C. Targeted Killing
Targeted killing is the practice of shooting or using bombs or other methods to kill
suspected terrorists without attempting to arrest them. Many nations have used targeted killing
to dispense with suspected terrorists. Russia, as mentioned above, reportedly sent a poison letter
to the person suspected of masterminding the 2000 Moscow apartment bombing.70 The United
States used a drone airplane in Yemen to kill a leader of the terrorist cell that struck the U.S.S.
Cole as he was riding in a car.71 And Israel has killed scores of suspected members of Hamas,

68

See id. ¶ 6.

69

Id.

70
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See James Risen & Judith Miller, Threats and Responses: Hunt for Suspects; C.I.A. is
Reported to Kill a Leader of al Qaeda in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A1.
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using everything from helicopter gunships to exploding cell phones.72

Is the targeted killing

of suspected terrorists lawful? At present, the answer, like so many answers, depends on
whether the action is viewed as a law enforcement measure or as a step taken in an armed
conflict. In general, the police cannot simply kill criminal suspects, but instead must arrest them.
In contrast, the military usually can kill enemy combatants without attempting to arrest them
unless they already have surrendered.
Consider first the rules regarding law enforcement. In the United States, the Fifth
Amendment plainly says: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . ."73 And the Fourth Amendment similarly prohibits "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.74 Based on these provisions, our courts have held that a police officer
may not "seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead."75 Instead, the police
are supposed to arrest suspects so that courts may determine their innocence or guilt and rule on
their punishment.
Multilateral treaties embody similar protections. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights says: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
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protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."76 The European Convention
on Human Rights says: "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law."77 The European Convention
contains exceptions allowing the police to kill criminal suspects, but only "in order to effect a
lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained."78
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials addresses the subject in detail.79 Article 9 says that "intentional lethal use
of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life."80 Article 10
further says that "law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and shall give a
clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warnings to be observed,
unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of
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death or serious harm to other persons . . . ."81 Under all of these various rules, targeted killing
of criminal suspects is illegal.
But the laws governing armed conflict are different. The first rule of warfare, according
to a not very humorous quip, is, "Thou shalt kill." When military forces are fighting a war, they
may attack enemy forces wherever they find them without affording them an opportunity to
surrender. This has been the law for a long time. In the United States, the Lieber Code of 1863
(promulgated as a military order to govern Union Forces during the Civil War) famously
declared: "Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies,
and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the
war . . . ."82 Still today, military forces may kill enemy combatants who have not surrendered,83
and nothing in the law of armed conflict requires military forces to afford the enemy the
opportunity to surrender before attacking them.
True, some prohibitions on assassination apply to the military. For example, the Annex
to Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, says: "In
addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . [t]o
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kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army . . . ."84 The U.S.
Army interprets this provision "as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an
enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy 'dead
or alive.'"85 But the Army also says that the provision does not "preclude attacks on individual
soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or
elsewhere."86 So under the U.S. view, military forces could kill suspected terrorists if they are
enemy combatants.
Two recent disputes illustrate how the categorization of targeting killing affects the
analysis of its legality. On November 3, 2002, the United States used an unmanned Predator
aircraft to attack a car in Yemen.87 The car was carrying six men, all of whom died in the attack.
One of the men was Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al-Qaida member suspected of masterminding the
October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.88 Another one of the men in the car was an
American citizen named Ahmed Hijazi.89 The United States and the government of Yemen
worked together in planning and executing the attack.90
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Subsequently, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions wrote a letter to the United States asking the government to explain the
incident and justify the killing of the men in the car.91 The letter referred to the provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights quoted above.92 In the letter, the Special
Rapporteur said that the action "constitutes a clear case of extrajudicial killing."93 In other
words, the Special Rapporteur saw the incident as an impermissible method of law enforcement.
The United States had a different view. It saw the military action not as a law
enforcement measure, but instead as a method of fighting a war against an armed enemy. In its
response, the United States said: "The United States . . . disagrees with the premise of the letter
and the conclusions contained in the report that military operations against enemy combatants
could be regarded as 'extrajudicial executions by consent of Governments.'"94 In its view, the
"conduct of a government in legitimate military operations, whether against Al Qaida operatives
or any other legitimate military target, would be governed by the international law of armed
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conflict."95 Under that law, the United States said, "enemy combatants may be attacked unless
they have surrendered or are otherwise rendered hors de combat."96 Accordingly, the United
States concluded, "Al Qaida terrorists who continue to plot attacks against the United States may
be lawful subjects of armed attack in appropriate circumstances."97
Litigants before the Israeli Supreme Court have engaged in a similar debate about the
lawfulness of targeted killing. A human rights group called Public Committee Against Torture
in Israel sued the government, seeking to enjoin the targeted killing of Palestinian activists.98 Its
brief described numerous incidents in which Israeli defense forces had located terrorists suspects
and then shot them or killed them with explosives.99
Like the Special Rapporteur in the Yemen incident, the Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel viewed the targeted killings as an impermissible method of law enforcement.
Its brief said: "The launching of missiles at a suspected terrorist, at a time when he does not pose
immediate danger to another person, is an execution without a trial. The killing of a man by
sniper fire, when that man is not engaged in specific activity that endangers the life of another
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person, is an execution without a trial. Booby trapping the car of a person, as suspect as he may
be, is an execution of a person that has not been convicted . . . ."100
But the Israeli government did not see it that way. It responded by saying that the laws of
war allow the Israeli defense forces to attack enemy combatants. Its brief said: "there is no
argument [but] that a person who takes a direct part in the hostilities is a legitimate target,
whatever his formal characterization (member of a conscription army, uniformed, guerilla
fighter, civilian, etc.) may be."101 No court issued a final ruling on the subject.102

D. Detention
The rules that govern the detention of criminal suspects differ from the rules that govern
the detention of enemy combatants. For this reason, the characterization of persons held as
terrorists often is very important. If these persons are viewed as criminal suspects, they
generally have greater rights than if they are viewed as enemy combatants in an armed conflict.
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Under the domestic law of the United States, law enforcement agencies generally may
detain criminal suspects only for the purpose of bringing them before a court for trial.103 They
are entitled to appear before a magistrate without unreasonable delay after they are arrested.104
This magistrate must order them released if probable cause does not exist to believe that they
have committed a crime.105 Even if probable cause does exist, the suspects then have a right to a
speedy trial.106 If they do not receive a speedy trial, they are entitled to dismissal of any
indictment and to release.107
Similar rules govern law enforcement outside the United States. For example, article 5 of
the European Convention on Human Rights provides: "No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: . . . (c) the
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lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence . . . ."108
But the law of armed conflict differs in several very important ways when it comes to
questions of detention. The law of armed conflict contemplates that in a war, a nation may need
to capture numerous enemy combatants and may need to hold them for many years. The United
States, for example, imprisoned hundreds of thousands of captured German, Italian, and Japanese
soldiers during World War II.109 Although litigants and commentators recently have disputed
some of these points, the following rules appear to apply to the detention of enemy combatants:
First, the law of armed conflict apparently permits a government to detain all enemy
belligerents regardless of whether they have committed any crimes. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a
plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the "capture and detention of lawful combatants
and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and
practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war.'"110 Justice Thomas, adding a fifth vote for this
proposition, agreed that the government may detain captured belligerents without charges.111
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This rule apparently applies regardless of the location in which the government captured the
belligerent or whether the belligerent is a United States citizen.112
Second, the government apparently needs to follow only minimal procedures for initially
determining who is an enemy combatant and who is not. These procedures apparently may place
the burden of proof on the detainee.113 They may establish a presumption in favor of the
government's evidence even if the evidence is based on hearsay.114 The government apparently
also does not have to afford the detainee the right to counsel.115
Third, if the military determines that a person is a belligerent, it may detain him at least
for the duration of the conflict in which he was captured.116 This rule allowed the United States
to hold German, Italian, and Japanese prisoners in World War II until the hostilities ceased. The
government does not have to release all detainees when the war ends; on the contrary, if the
government convicts a detainee of war crimes, it may also imprison him or her as sentenced by a
court just like any other criminal suspect.
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As a result of these rules, suspected terrorists face very different treatment depending on
whether they are viewed as criminal suspects or instead as enemy combatants. So naturally
many debates have arisen over how to characterize suspected terrorists. An ongoing example of
this debate concerns persons whom the United States has detained in its war on terror.
Consider again the case of Jose Padilla, the American citizen who fought against the
United States in Afghanistan and who was captured at O'Hare airport in Chicago.117 When
Padilla challenged the legality of his confinement in a naval brig without charges, a debate
quickly arose over how to characterize him. The district court viewed Padilla as a criminal
suspect. It said:
Simply stated, this is a law enforcement matter, not a military matter. The
civilian authorities captured Petitioner just as they should have. At the time that
Petitioner was arrested . . . any alleged terrorist plans that he harbored were
thwarted. From then on, he was available to be questioned--and was indeed
questioned--just like any other citizen accused of criminal conduct. This is as it
should be.118
Because the government had not brought criminal charges against Padilla, the district court
ordered Padilla released, just as it would order the release of any criminal suspect whom the
government had not charged.119 The district court left open the possibility that the government
could continue to hold Padilla if it were to bring criminal charges against him.120
Outside organizations agree with this characterization of terrorist suspects. Amnesty
International, for example, has declared that the detention of suspected terrorists without charges
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by the United States is a "continuing violation of human rights standards which the international
community must not ignore."121 It has urged that "detainees should be charged with
recognisably criminal offences and tried within a reasonable time, or released."122
But the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressed a different view when it
considered the Padilla case. It reversed the district court because it agreed that the President
could characterize Padilla as an "enemy combatant" rather than as a mere criminal suspect.123
The court then held: "Because Padilla is an enemy combatant, and because his detention is . . .
necessary . . . in order to prevent his return to the battlefield, the President is authorized . . . to
detain Padilla as a fundamental incident to the conduct of war."124
The debate about whether to characterize persons accused of terrorism as criminal
suspects or enemy combatants is not confined to the United States. For example, nearly five
decades ago, the Irish government detained a man named Richard Lawless for several months
without charges.125 It justified this detention on grounds that Lawless was suspected of
belonging to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), an organization described as "a secret army
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engaged in unconstitutional activities and using violence to attain its purposes"126 and blamed for
an "alarming increase in terrorist activities."127 The government contended that it needed to
detain Lawless "to prevent the maintaining of military or armed forces other than those
authorised by the Constitution."128 Thus, just as the United States saw Jose Padilla as an enemy
combatant belonging to al-Qaida, the Irish government saw Lawless as a soldier for the IRA.
Lawless had a different view. He saw himself as a mere criminal suspect, and argued that
his detention without charges violated article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.129
This provision as quoted above, prohibits arrests other than for the purpose of bringing a criminal
suspect before a judge "on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence . . . ."130
Lawless argued that the Irish government had not brought him before a judge or asserted any
charges against him.131
The European Court of Human Rights sided with Lawless's characterization, but it denied
him any relief. It concluded that the detention was contrary to article 5 of the European
Convention because the Irish government had not charged him with any offense.132 But it could
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offer no remedy because it concluded that the Irish government had followed the proper
procedures for derogating from the European Human Rights Convention.133

E. Trials
Criminal suspects have many rights when they come to trial in civilian courts. In the
United States, for example, the Fifth Amendment grants criminal suspects a general right to due
process and a specific right not to be tried absent a grand jury indictment,134 and the Sixth
Amendment affords them a right to have a speedy and public trial, to be tried by a jury, to be
tried in the district where the crime occurred, and to confront the witnesses against them.135 And
multilateral treaties also require the United States and other nations to provide important trial
rights. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates that
criminal suspects have a trial before an independent judge136 and appellate review by a separate
appellate tribunal.137
In contrast, some enemy combatants do not have the same rights when they come to trial
before a "military commission." A military commission is a tribunal consisting of a panel of
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military officers or a combination of military officers and civilians.138 The United States has
used military commissions throughout its history to try persons accused of war crimes.139
During and immediately after World War II, for instance, allied forces used military
commissions to try many German soldiers and civilians accused of war crimes.140 These war
crimes included many different kinds of offenses, including the offense of fighting as an
unlawful combatant.141
The Supreme Court has held that military commissions do not have to follow the same
trial procedures that civilian criminal courts use. Military commissions, for example, need not
provide persons suspected of war crimes with a trial by jury.142 They also do not have to state
the charges against a suspect with the specificity of an ordinary criminal indictment.143
Because criminal suspects have different rights from enemy combatants, the now familiar
debate over characterization arises when nations want to try persons accused of committing
terrorist acts. One side of the debate argues that these persons should be characterized as
criminal defendants and should have all of the rights that criminal defendants enjoy. The other
side argues that they can be characterized as enemy combatants and given trials by military
commission for committing war crimes, such as fighting as an unlawful combatant.
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This debate has gone on for several years in the United States. In November 2001,
shortly after the infamous attacks of September 11th, President Bush ordered the creation of
military commissions to try foreign terror suspects.144 This order describes these suspects not as
criminals but as persons engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.145 The order
guarantees them the right to a "full and fair" trial but does not guarantee them all the rights that
criminal defendants in the United States would have.146
Although no trials have yet taken place, persons facing trial by military commission
under the President's order have challenged their constitutionality. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, for
example, a suspected member of al-Qaida claimed that his trial by military commission would
violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial that criminal suspects have in civilian
courts.147 The Supreme Court has granted review in this case, and soon will decide the issue.148
The European Court of Human Rights has confronted a similar question of
characterization. During the 1990s, Turkey used the "Ankara State Security Court" to try
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persons suspected of terrorism.149 This court was not called a military commission but it
resembled one because it included a military officer as one of its judges.150 In 1994, this special
court convicted Selim Sadak and several others of terrorist offenses in connection with their
support for the banned Kurdish Workers Party.151 Sadak and the others subsequently sued
Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that the inclusion of a military officer
on the Ankara State Security Court violated the European Convention on Human Rights.152
The European Court of Human Rights agreed. In its view, Turkey had not given Sadak
and the other applicants the rights owed to criminal defendants.153 Article 6 of the European
Convention provides that "[i]n the determination of . . . any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair . . . hearing . . . by an independent and impartial tribunal . . . ." The
Court concluded that the military officer, although trained as a judge, would feel pressure to
convict the accused to satisfy the government, and thus that the court lacked impartiality.154
Turkey had disagreed with the characterization of Sadak and the others as mere criminals.
It argued that the nation was engaged in a military campaign against terrorism. "In view of the
experience of the armed forces in the anti-terrorism campaign," the Turkish government
explained, it "had considered it necessary to strengthen [the Ankara State Security Court] by
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including a military judge in order to provide the court with the necessary expertise and
knowledge of how to deal with threats to the security and integrity of the State."155
Yet another example comes from Egypt. Throughout the 1990s, Egypt used military
courts to try militants suspected of threatening the government with terrorist acts. Egypt has
contended that these military courts are necessary for dealing with armed combatants.156 Human
rights groups, however, contend that they violate international standards for the treatment of
criminal suspects.157

F. Search and Seizure
The issue of whether to characterize terrorists as criminals or enemy combatants also
arises in the context of search and seizure by the government. The characterization matters
because criminal suspects have rights to privacy that enemy combatants traditionally have not
had.
In the criminal law context, the Fourth Amendment imposes an important restriction on
law enforcement activity by requiring that searches and seizures be reasonable.158 The Supreme
Court has held that a "search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of
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individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."159 So the police cannot simply seize and search any
homes, cars, and places of business merely in the hopes of finding evidence of criminal activity.
In contrast, when the military is fighting a war, it does not face similar constraints. The
Supreme Court has held that the constitutional power to declare war necessarily "involves the
power to prosecute it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately
prosecuted."160 Accordingly, the Court has reasoned, the federal government's war power
"includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at the will
of the captor."161 Indeed, the Court said: "This is and always has been an undoubted belligerent
right."162
So how do these general principles apply to searches and seizures made in response to
terrorism? Consider the case of United States v. Green.163 A woman named Green drove her car
on a major road in San Antonio, Texas.164 The road passed through Fort Sam Houston, an open
military reservation through which the public could drive.165 On the road, within the boundaries
of the reservation, military police had set up a check point.166 At this check point, the military
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police were stopping every sixth car to search for terrorists, as a means of deterring terrorism.167
Pursuant to this policy, the military police stopped Green's car. In the car, they found cocaine,
and then arrested Green.168
Green argued that this suspicionless stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Citing the
rules summarized above, the court agreed that the search would have been unconstitutional if the
military police had simply been searching for criminals or trying to prevent general criminal
activity.169 But the court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit searches conducted
by the military when it is engaged in "the protection of the nation's military installations from
acts of domestic or international terrorism."170 The court reasoned that looking for terrorists on a
military reservation was more like this traditional military function than like criminal law
enforcement.171 As a result of the court's characterizing the stop as a military action against
terrorism instead of a law enforcement measure, Green could not rely on the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
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A similar situation arose in the European Court of Human Rights in Murray v. United
Kingdom.172 The British Army went to the home of Murray to arrest her and question her about
suspected terrorist activities, including financing the procurement of arms for the IRA.173 Upon
entering the home, they searched it for other occupants, and made all of Murray's family gather
in one room.174
Murray and her family challenged the army's action under article 8 of the European
Convention.175 This article, which resembles the Fourth Amendment, provides that "[e]veryone
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence" and it
generally prohibits interference with this right except when "necessary" for law enforcement,
public safety, and other purposes.176 But the court disagreed, observing that this was not an
ordinary law enforcement measure but instead a military security action. Citing the
"responsibility of an elected government in a democratic society to protect its citizens and its
institutions against the threats posed by organised terrorism and to the special problems involved
in the arrest and detention of persons suspected of terrorist-linked offences" the court found the
army's actions to satisfy article 8's requirement of "necessity."177 So again, because the incident
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was viewed as a military response rather than a law enforcement measure, Murray had different
rights from those an ordinary criminal suspect would have.

G. Duty to Provide Security
The issue of whether to characterize terrorists as criminals or enemy combatants also
arises in debates about the government's duty to provide security to potential victims of
terrorism. At least as an abstract matter, governments have a duty both to prevent and punish
crime and to protect their citizens from armed attacks. The preamble to the Constitution, for
example, identifies insuring "domestic tranquility" and providing for "common defense" as two
main objects of the federal government.178
But these abstract duties are not necessarily enforceable in the courts. On the contrary,
both in the United States and in foreign countries, the judiciary has shown a greater willingness
to intercede into law enforcement matters than into military affairs. Accordingly, potential
victims of terrorism may have a greater ability to obtain a judicial order directing the government
to take actions against terrorism if terrorists are seen as criminals than if they are seen as enemy
combatants.
Consider, for example, the case of A. v. United Kingdom & Ireland.179 The case arose
after IRA terrorists killed a reserve constable in Northern Ireland while he was tending to his
family's dairy business.180 The decedent's widow sued the United Kingdom in the European
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Court of Human Rights, claiming that the United Kingdom was violating article 2(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights.181 This article mandates that everyone's right to life
"shall be protected by law."182 She asserted that the United Kingdom was not doing enough to
provide security and demanded greater military involvement in the anti-terrorism campaign. She
asked the court to require the United Kingdom to provide greater security from terrorist attacks
"not only by criminal prosecution of offenders but also by such preventive control, through
deployment of its armed forces, as appears necessary . . . ."183
The European Commission on Human Rights, which handled the case for the court,184
ruled against her. To the extent that the terrorists were seen as an enemy threat requiring a
military response, the commission concluded that it could not act. The commission observed
that the United Kingdom had committed military forces to Northern Ireland,185 but the
commission said that it could not be "its task" to assess the "appropriateness and efficiency" of
this military force.186
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In contrast, the commission apparently saw no difficulty in judging the United Kingdom's
counter-terrorism law enforcement effort. It agreed that the United Kingdom had a duty to
provide security against murder.187 But it concluded that the applicant had no claim. The
commission observed that the "the applicant does not suggest that there are no laws in Northern
Ireland protecting the right to life, or that they are not applied."188
Plaintiffs have had similar difficulty recovering from the United States for not providing
security against terrorism. Sovereign immunity generally shields the federal government from
liability in court.189 The United States has waived some of its sovereign immunity in the Federal
Tort Claims Act.190 But it has retained immunity from lawsuits pertaining to a "discretionary
function."191
The retention of immunity for discretionary functions generally blocks claims against the
United States for failing to provide protection against armed attacks. For example, in Macharia
v. United States, plaintiffs injured by the 1998 terrorist bombing of the United States embassy in
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Kenya sued the United States for failing to secure the embassy against a terrorist attack.192 The
United States had provided a detachment of Marines to guard the facility, but they had not
succeeded in stopping its bombing by agents of al-Qaida.193 The court did not determine
whether the U.S. had acted negligently because it held that the discretionary function exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act applied, and that the United States was therefore immune from
liability.194
But the discretionary function exception does not always shield the federal government
from liability for failing to protect its citizens from terrorists when those acts are viewed as
crimes. For example, in Bergman v. United States,195 the plaintiffs participated in "Freedom
Rides" in 1961.196 They rode buses to cities in the southern United States to protest segregation.
Unknown assailants subjected them to terror, assaults, and intimidation, causing various
injuries.197 The plaintiffs claimed in part that the FBI had negligently failed to protect them from
the attacks that they endured.198 The federal government in response argued that it had immunity
from this lawsuit.199 The court rejected this argument, concluding that once the FBI had
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undertaken to stop crime, it had a duty not to perform this undertaking in a negligent manner.200
It therefore allowed the plaintiffs to bring lawsuits under the Federal Tort Claims Act.201
Although few other cases have reached this conclusion, the decision shows how judges may
view the government's duty to provide protection against crimes as something different from the
government's duty to provide protection against armed attacks.

H. Compensation for Harm
The government often uses violent measures to respond to terrorism. For example, as
described in the section on targeted killing above,202 military forces may fire missiles at a
terrorist target with the aim of killing the terrorist suspects and destroying their property.
Actions of this kind may cause three kinds of damage and injury. First, they may destroy actual
terrorist targets, like installations that al-Qaida is using for training or operations. Second, they
might damage things that the government believes are terrorist targets but which later turn out
not to be. For example, armed forces may destroy a warehouse on the belief that it contains
weapons, only to find out later that it contained civilian clothing. Third, they may cause
"collateral damage." Collateral damage is "unavoidable and unplanned damage to civilian
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personnel and property incurred while attacking a military objective."203 For example, when
military forces fire missiles at suspected al-Qaida installations, the missiles may destroy not only
their targets but also unintentionally wreck nearby structures, vehicles, or other items.
When the government destroys property in anti-terrorism operations, a question
sometimes arises about whether the government has a duty to pay for it. The question is not
difficult when military forces destroy actual terrorist targets: the government does not have to
pay. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has said: "A contrary rule
that, by way of example, would require the government to provide compensation for the
destruction of a vehicle (a tank, jet, etc.) used to engage United States armed forces in battle,
strikes us as absurd in the extreme."204
But compensation for destruction of supposed terrorist targets that actually are
unconnected with terrorism and compensation for collateral damage are more difficult issues. In
the United States, the Fifth Amendment says that the government may not "take" private
property for public use without paying just compensation to the owner.205 Governmental
"taking" of property may consist of occupying, destroying, or sometimes merely preventing the
owner from using the property.206 The rationale appears to be that taxpayers as a group should
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have to bear the costs of public projects, not just the people whose property is needed.207 The
innocent owners of property destroyed in anti-terrorism operations thus have some argument that
the public should share the expense of these operations. But whether that argument prevails or
not depends in large part on whether the government was pursuing the anti-terrorism action as a
military matter or as a law enforcement matter.
The case of El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States,208 concerned an
incident that occurred after the 1998 bombings of two United States embassies in Africa.209 In
response to the bombings, the President ordered the Navy to fire Tomahawk missiles at a
pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.210 The missiles hit their target and destroyed the facility. The
White House explained at the time that the factory had links to al-Qaida and that the factory
possibly was producing a chemical used in the manufacture of nerve gas.211
The owner of the destroyed pharmaceutical plant subsequently sued the United States in
the United States Court of Federal Claims, seeking compensation for the damage under the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.212 The United States asked the court to reject the claim,
citing among other principles the rule regarding the destruction of "enemy property" discussed

207

See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Cost, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 391 (2000).
208

378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005).

209

See supra part II.A. (discussing this incident in connection with the rules regarding the
use of force in other countries).
210

See id. at 1349.

211

See id.

212

See id. at 1355.
47

above.213 Although the owner argued in response that the military exception should not apply
because the factory actually had no connection to terrorism or nerve gas,214 the court denied
relief. It held that the issue of whether a target was actually enemy property or not was a
political question and that the court had to defer to the President's judgment.215
In contrast, at least in some jurisdictions, when law enforcement agencies are pursuing
criminal suspects and they destroy property belonging to an innocent person, they must pay for
the damage. For example, in Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., a suspected drug
dealer broke into a nearby home while fleeing from the police.216 The police fired tear gas and
concussion grenades into the home to force the suspect out, causing extensive damage to the
building.217 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "where an innocent third party's property is
damaged by the police in the course of apprehending a suspect," the government must pay just
compensation to the property owner.218
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Similarly, in Steele v. City of Houston,219 a group of escaped prisoners hid out in a vacant
home that they had chosen at random. To force them out, the police set fire to the building.220
The Texas Supreme Court required the city to pay the property owner for the damage.221 The
Court said: "We do not hold that the police officers wrongfully ordered the destruction of the
dwelling; we hold that the innocent third parties are entitled by the Constitution to compensation
for their property."222 As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in a similar case when it
required the police to pay for doors broken in the execution of a search warrant: "Since the
damage was incurred for the public good, rather than for the benefit of the private individual, the
public should bear the cost. The intended beneficiary of the police action was not [the innocent
property owner], but society as a whole."223
These cases suggest that, if law enforcement officials had destroyed a facility that they
thought belonged to a terrorist suspect but that actually belonged to an innocent party, the
government would have to pay for the damage caused. The political question doctrine would not
protect the government. So victims' rights differ substantially depending on whether the military
is pursuing terrorists as enemy combatants or law enforcement agencies are going after terrorists
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as criminals.

I.What Dichotomous Characterization Does not Determine
The first claim in this article is that the dichotomous characterization of suspected
terrorists as either criminal suspects or enemy combatants has become a central part of antiterrorism law. The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the validity of this claim. It has
shown how the results of characterization affect not just one or two areas, like detention and
interrogation, but many different areas.

And it has shown that this requirement of

characterization has been important not just in recent years, but for decades.

Yet

it

is

important not to overstate the claim. Although characterization is important, it is not the only
issue in determining the legality of governmental responses to terrorism. On the contrary, even
if everyone were to agree on characterizing certain terrorists as enemy combatants rather than as
ordinary criminal suspects, a number of other questions might arise. Some examples of the
issues that would remain include:
•

when enemy combatants have the rights of "prisoners of war" under Geneva Convention
III when they are captured;224

•

when enemy combatants are entitled to "combatant immunity," which is immunity for
punishment for lawful acts of war;225

•

how to measure the duration of an armed conflict against terrorism for determining how
long enemy combatants may be detained;226
224
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•

what trial procedures military commissions have to follow when they try enemy
combatants;227

•

what offenses may military commissions punish enemy combatants for having
committed;228

•

what interrogation methods may the military use in attempting to gain information from
enemy combatants;229

•

the extent to which persons held as enemy combatants have a constitutional right to due
process;230 and

•

the extent to which citizens who are enemy combatants have different rights from noncitizens.231
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But it is also important not to underestimate the current importance of characterization. Until an
initial determination is made that suspected terrorists are enemy combatants, none of the issues
listed immediately come into dispute.

III. THE PROBLEMS WITH DICHOTOMOUS CHARACTERIZATION
The previous part of this article has shown that legal systems around the world, for a long
time and in a great many different subject areas, have depended on characterization to determine
the legality of governmental responses to terrorism. Sometimes they characterize these
responses as law enforcement measures and, at other times, they describe them as military efforts
in an armed conflict. The characterization selected currently has important legal consequences.
Armed forces involved in a war can take actions, such as targeted killing, that the police
cannot.232 And the police can carry out actions, such as law enforcement duties, that the armed
forces cannot.233

This "military or law enforcement" classification system for determining

the legality of governmental responses to terrorism has four substantial problems. First, no
standard currently exists for deciding when terrorists are combatants as opposed to mere
criminals, or when anti-terrorism actions are law enforcement measures as opposed to military
actions in an armed conflict. Second, no clear standard is likely to emerge in the future because
terrorists defy a simple characterization; they resemble criminal suspects in some respects, and
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enemy combatants in others. Third, even when dichotomous characterization is possible, using it
to determine what laws should regulate governmental responses to terrorism often produces
results that are objectionable on policy grounds. Fourth, the current system effectively gives
governments extremely broad discretion to determine the legality of their own anti-terrorism
actions because their control of the characterization process effectively allows them to select the
applicable set of legal rules. The following discussion elaborates these points.

A. No Standard for Characterization Exists
One fundamental problem with attempting to decide what body of law regulates
governmental responses to terrorism, is that no commonly accepted or consistently applied
standard has developed for deciding whether to characterize terrorists as enemy combatants or
ordinary criminals. In fact, disagreement currently exists at two levels.
First, there are opposing views about the fundamental question of whether terrorists who
are not sponsored by a state can ever fall into the category of enemy combatants. As described
above, components of the United Nations appear to reject the position of most of the world's
leading democracies on this issue. The International Court of Justice, for example, said in the
Israeli Fence case that terrorists cannot engage in "armed attacks" because they are not states.234
This position fundamentally conflicts with the unanimous view of all of the members of NATO,
which viewed the attacks of September 11, 2001, as a armed attack.235
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Second, even those who agree that terrorists in proper circumstances can be viewed as
enemy combatants have not established exactly what those circumstances are. The United
States, for instance, repeatedly has seen terrorist strikes as acts of war.236 And yet the United
States has not articulated a clear standard through which it has made that characterization. In
domestic legal cases, the United States has consistently decided not to express a standard;
instead, it has told the judiciary that it should defer to the determinations of Congress and the
President.237 The federal courts generally have granted this deference.238 In international
contexts, where the United States cannot rely on deference, the government has offered some
brief substantive explanations for its characterization of terrorists as combatants. But these
explanations lack definiteness. For example, as explained above, following the United States'
targeted killing of al-Qaida suspects in Yemen, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for ExtraJudicial Killings demanded that the United States explain why the suspects should not have
received ordinary criminal justice protections.239 In response, the United States offered this
explanation: "Al Qaida and related terrorist networks are at war against the United States. They
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have trained, equipped, and supported armed forces and have planned and executed attacks
around the world against the United States on a scale that far exceeds criminal activity."240
In the quoted passage, the United States appears to have taken the position that the
magnitude of the terrorist incident or incidents determines whether law enforcement principles or
the law of war govern anti-terrorism responses. A focus on the size of the terrorist attacks has
some justification. Certainly, it accords with general understandings about one important
difference between ordinary crimes and acts of war. And it can explain why the United States
felt justified in using military actions in response to al-Qaida's destruction of the United States'
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, for the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 1998, and the
attacks of September 11, 2001.241 All of these incidents caused many deaths and great
destruction of property.
But can a magnitude standard explain the United States' military assault on Libya in
response to the 1985 bombing of the Berlin discotheque? That terrorist attack resulted in two
deaths.242 It thus does not appear to have had a "scale that far exceeds criminal activity." And if
magnitude is the test, why did the United States not treat Timothy McVeigh or the 1993 World
Trade Center bombers as enemy combatants? McVeigh's terrorist attack on the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City killed 168 people,243 while the World Trade Center bombing caused
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six deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars in property loss.244 Yet, the United States
subjected the perpetrators of these terrorist incidents to ordinary criminal process.245 These
questions remain unanswered.
In short, despite the great importance currently placed on characterization for determining
governmental powers and individual rights, no international consensus exists on when to
characterize terrorist suspects as enemy combatants as opposed to ordinary criminals. And the
United States' proffered standard of magnitude is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive, at
least in terms of the United States' past practice.

B. Anti-Terrorism Measures Defy Simple Characterization
Not only has no consensus developed on when to judge anti-terrorism responses as law
enforcement measures and when to judge them as steps taken in an armed conflict, but it also
seems unlikely that any agreement on a test ever will emerge. This prediction rests on the simple
observation that most acts of terrorism have a dual nature: they resemble warfare in some
respects and crimes in others. And this dual nature prevents dichotomous characterization of
governmental responses. Most terrorist acts resemble crimes because they are crimes. Murder is
murder, assault is assault, and kidnaping is kidnaping, regardless of whether a terrorist or a
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mobster or street thug commits them. Consequently, at least in the United States, prosecutors
can and routinely do prosecute terrorists using ordinary criminal laws.246
Terrorists also often resemble criminals in terms of strategy. Terrorists, like most
criminals, usually pick easy, high value targets. Unlike military forces, terrorists and criminals
generally do not strive to use overwhelming force against the most significant enemy strengths
with the goal of obtaining a clear and incapacitating victory. To succeed, terrorists generally do
not need to cause crushing devastation any more than bank robbers need to destroy the banking
system.
On the other hand, terrorist organizations have many features in common with military
forces. First, terrorists commonly use military weapons to commit their acts. For example,
members of the terrorist organization Hamas routinely hit Israeli targets using mortars and
rockets located in the West Bank or in Gaza.247 Second, terrorists also tend to strike military
targets that ordinary criminals would have little interest in assaulting. For example, no one but
terrorists or an opposing Navy would have an interest in trying to sink the U.S.S. Cole. Third,
terrorist organizations may have capabilities that outmatch those of law enforcement agencies. If
the combined military forces of the United States and its many allies need years to subdue alQaida agents in Afghanistan, certainly no police force could accomplish the same mission.
Fourth, in many instances, as the United States has argued,248 acts of terrorism exceed ordinary
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criminal conduct in magnitude. Strikes like those of September 11, 2001, cause death and
destruction far beyond anything a typical criminal would ever attempt. Fifth, terrorist
organizations also often resemble military forces more than criminals in terms of their
persistence and their depth of capacity. When a member of a terrorist organization is arrested or
killed, instead of halting its operations, the organization generally finds a replacement and
continues its plans. In contrast, if the police thwart a bank robbery by arresting the would-be
perpetrator, often no subsequent robbery is likely to occur. This feature of terrorist organizations
makes them much more difficult to eradicate. Sixth, terrorists routinely take credit for their
actions. They want the world to know what they have done; that is the whole point of their
infliction of pain. In this way, terrorists resemble armed forces more than criminals, who
generally hope to avoid identification and blame.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, most acts of terrorism resemble acts of wars
more than criminal acts in terms of their most basic motivations. Governments fight wars in the
belief that organized violence will accomplish political ends that diplomacy cannot. Although
their methods are unlawful, terrorists generally act for similar reasons. But criminals generally
have more selfish goals; they commit offenses to line their pockets with money or harm their
personal enemies, but not to cause political change. In fact, some definitions of terrorism focus
primarily on motivation to distinguish it from ordinary crime.249
Terrorists, acts of terrorism, and governmental responses to terrorism for these reasons all
have a dual nature. They fall partly within the realm of crime and law enforcement and partly
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within the realm of armed conflict and military force. They generally defy characterization as
one or the other.

C. Unlimited Application of Either Body of Law
Even if a clear test emerged for deciding when terrorist acts move beyond being mere
crimes and instead become acts of war, another difficulty would remain: In many situations, the
unlimited application of either the laws of war or the laws regarding criminal law enforcement to
counter-terrorism measures seems problematic from a policy perspective. The laws of war often
appear to afford the government more power than it needs to combat terrorism, while the rules
regarding law enforcement often provide too little.
To see this point, assume that the United States is correct that the various attacks
perpetrated by al-Qaida do constitute acts of war. Using the dichotomous characterization
approach, it follows then that members of al-Qaida are enemy combatants. And it further
follows that the law of war governs their treatment.
Applying the law of war seems uncontroversial when the United States is attacking
armed formations of al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan. For example, I predict that most would
agreed that the United States may use deadly force against these enemies without first trying to
arrest them.250 Indeed, given that al-Qaida forces remain active in Afghanistan despite years of
eradication attempts by 20,000 American and allied military personnel, any suggestion that the
FBI as opposed to the Armed Forces should have gone to Afghanistan to arrest the perpetrators
of the 9/11 attacks seems hopelessly unrealistic.
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But even if members of al-Qaida are enemy combatants, it may not follow that the United
States should, as a policy matter, have the power to use all of the military force against all alQaida members that the laws of war would allow it to use against more conventional enemy
combatants. Consider again the case of Jose Padilla, the American citizen who according to
stipulated facts went to Afghanistan, fought with al-Qaida against the United States, fled to
Pakistan, and then returned to the United States, where U.S. marshals arrested him at Chicago's
O'Hare airport.251 A great deal of controversy has surrounded Padilla's prolonged detention. But
ignore the detention issue for a moment and think instead about what the United States might
have done at the airport when Padilla stepped off the airplane. If Padilla is truly an enemy
combatant, then presumably the United States could have shot him immediately, without first
attempting to arrest him. After all, that is what the law of war permits.
But I suspect that most people would think that simply shooting Padilla at the airport
would be wrong. The United States did not take that action. And when asked during oral
argument at the Supreme Court whether it could have done so, counsel for the government
tactfully avoided the question.252 Presumably the government also felt uncomfortable about the
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logical consequences of its contentions that Padilla is an enemy combatant and that the laws of
war therefore should govern his treatment.
The dichotomous characterization approach also may fail to accord with widely accepted
views when it prevents certain military responses to terrorism. For example, consider again the
case of John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, the notorious "D.C. snipers."253 As described above,
observers disagreed about whether the military was violating the Posse Comitatus Act by
assisting law enforcement.254 But even assuming that everyone were to agree that the Army was
assisting in law enforcement, most people would not consider this assistance inappropriate from
a policy perspective. As one New York Times reporter put it, "[f]or thousands of people in the
Washington region ducking behind their cars as they pump gas, keeping their children indoors or
missing the high school football season, there is no limit to what should be done to thwart the
sniper who has shot 11 people this month."255 Thus, the difficulty of classifying the antiterrorism
measures is only part of the problem with the current legal rules. Another part of the problem is
that the full application of either law enforcement rules or the laws of war often does not make
sense from a policy perspective even if characterization can occur.

MR. CLEMENT: Not after we captured them and brought them to safety. And I think in
every case, there are rules of engagement, there are rules for the appropriate force that
should be used.
Tr. of Oral Arg., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2004 W.L. 1066129 (U.S.) (No. 03-1027). Notice that Mr.
Clement did say whether the United States could have shot Padilla before he was captured; he
avoided the question.
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D. Discretion to Determine Legality
A further problem with reliance on dichotomous characterization is that governments
now have a great deal of discretion, after terrorist acts have occurred, to determine what law will
apply to the government's anti-terrorism responses. This discretion has easily predicted
consequences. If governments believe that rules governing law enforcement offer them an
advantage, they will treat the matter as a criminal incident. But if they think that the law
pertaining to military force will yield more favorable results, they will label the terrorists
involved as enemy combatants and proceed accordingly.
The possibility that the government may have some choice over which body of law
applies to a governmental action by itself is not alarming. On the contrary, this possibility exists
in many different contexts. But generally, when the government has choices of this kind, it also
faces tradeoffs; the government usually cannot have its cake and eat it too. For example, in the
area of military justice, military commanders generally have a choice of referring charges of
misconduct to a summary court-martial, a special court-martial, or a general court-martial.256
Each of these courts-martial operates under different procedures. At a summary court-martial,
for instance, the charges are decided by a single military officer who generally is not a military
judge.257 At a general court-martial, by contrast, the accused has a right to be tried by a court
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consisting of a military judge and not less than five service members.258 But a summary courtmartial can impose only a limited range of punishments; it cannot order confinement for more
than a month.259 A general court-martial, in contrast, can impose life imprisonment or even the
death penalty.260
So a commander has a choice in referring charges to a court-martial but also faces a
tradeoff. The summary court-martial has simpler and speedier procedures but is limited in its
power, while the general court-martial has greater powers but affords the accused greater
procedural protections. The existence of this tradeoff preserves flexibility, without giving
commanders unlimited discretion at the expense of the accused.
This kind of tradeoff generally does not exist in the area of counter-terrorism. Consider
once more the case of Jose Padilla, the American citizen who took up arms against the United
States in Afghanistan before being captured in Chicago.261 As noted, the government initially
held him as a witness in a grand jury investigation. But when that law enforcement
characterization was not sufficient to permit his continued detention, and the government
apparently lacked probable cause to charge him with a crime, the President designated him as an
enemy combatant. The federal courts subsequently have upheld his continued confinement
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under this designation.262 There was never a tradeoff involved; the government did not have to
give up anything.
In addition, in most other contexts in which the government has the power to exercise
discretion, some legal standard governs the exercise of that discretion. In investigating criminal
activity, for example, the government has discretion to decide what searches to conduct. It may
choose to search some premises but not others. But in exercising this discretion, the government
always faces a restriction. The Fourth Amendment imposes a standard of reasonableness on all
searches.263 This standard, although open-ended, nevertheless constrains the government's
choices.264 And courts stand ready to enforce this standard.265
But again nothing comparable exists when it comes to the characterization of
governmental responses to terrorism as either law enforcement measures or actions taken in an
armed conflict. The President simply decides whether to characterize a person as an enemy
combatant as opposed to an ordinary criminal suspect. In the United States, the courts defer to
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this decision.266 And in the international sphere, although disagreements have arisen, the United
States and other countries usually just ignore opposing views. For example, although the United
Nations General Assembly condemned the United States' bombing of Libya, and the U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Extra-Judicial Killings condemned its targeted killing of suspected
members of al-Qaida, the United States government could and simply did disregard their
views.267
In making these criticisms, I do not mean to suggest that the United States or other
countries have made incorrect choices when exercising the discretion that they currently have.
On the contrary, in the examples discussed, strong legal and policy arguments support the
treatment of Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant, the bombing of Libya, and the targeted killing
in Yemen.268 But even if governments make correct choices, they are still operating in a system
that involves no tradeoffs, no standards, and not very much review. A system of this kind over
time may give rise to abuse.
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III.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CREATING SPECIALIZED LAWS TO
REGULATE GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

The forgoing parts of this article have attempted to establish the validity of two claims.
The first claim is that the legality of a wide range of governmental responses to terrorism
depends, and for a long time and in many different countries has depended, on a question of
characterization. What governments may and may not do turns on whether terrorists are seen as
criminals or enemy combatants, whether their deeds are seen as crimes or acts of war, and
whether the government responds with law enforcement officers or armed forces. The second
claim is that this emphasis on dichotomous characterization presents various problems. No
standard currently exists or in all likelihood will emerge for making the required
characterization. Determining which law will apply by means of characterization often produces
bad results from a policy perspective. And governments generally have broad, standardless, and
effectively unreviewable discretion in characterization, making abuse possible.
This part of the article now makes a third claim: Creating specialized laws to regulate
governmental responses to terrorism might provide a solution to the difficulties with the current
system. New specialized laws could borrow from both the civilian law enforcement rules and
the law of armed conflict. But its content would turn on deliberate policy choices of legislatures,
and not on the awkward initial characterization of whether the terrorists are committing crimes or
fighting a war.

A. The Benefits of Specialized Laws
Creating specialized laws to govern responses to terrorism could address problems with
the current system in several ways. First, specialized laws would reduce or eliminate the
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difficulties of determining the legality of governmental responses to terrorism based on the
indeterminate task of characterizing terrorists as criminals or enemy combatants and
characterizing their assaults as crimes or acts of war. Instead, specialized laws could view
terrorists exactly for what they are: persons who share some of the characteristics of both
criminals and enemy combatants.
Rather than specifying the legality of targeted killing, detentions, military trials, and other
responses to terrorism based on dichotomous characterization, the legislators creating the
specialized laws could determine when each response makes sense as a policy matter and when it
does not. For example, after substantive debate of the merits, Congress might pass a law
amending the Posse Comitatus Act to say that the military may assist law enforcement in
tracking snipers suspected of having killed more than three persons. This law would not require
decision makers to get into the question of whether snipers (like those who terrorized the
Washington, D.C., area) are criminals or enemy combatants.269 Or the United Nations might
change its interpretation of article 51 of its charter to permit the use of military force in foreign
countries in self-defense in response to certain kinds of assaults by organizations that the security
council previously has classified as terrorists.270 Debates about whether the use of force then
would not depend on the difficult question of whether terrorist acts constitute "armed attacks"
like those of armed forces.271
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Second, specialized laws regulating governmental responses to terrorism could be written
to apply only in situations that have policy justifications persuasive to legislators. Under the
current system, as explained above, if a suspected terrorist is characterized as an enemy
combatant, then the laws of war would appear to permit military forces to take any actions
against him that they could take against any enemy combatant. To return to the Padilla example,
military forces could not only detain him at a public airport, but also take the seemingly
excessive measure of shooting him at the airport before he surrenders.272 In contrast, a
specialized law on targeted killing might establish more limited rules of engagement. For
instance, it might specify that military forces cannot carry out a targeted killing against an
unarmed suspect in the United States who does not pose an immediate threat.273
Third, specialized laws on terrorism could narrow the government's discretion to choose
the law that applies to its own conduct. Rather than having the government decide on a case-bycase basis and in an unreviewable manner whether a person accused of terrorism is a criminal
suspect or an enemy combatant--and in this way determine what legal rules will regulate the
government's actions toward him or her--a specialized law might channel the government's
actions. For example, a specialized law might allow the President to detain terrorist suspects as
enemy combatants, but provide that detainees who could be charged with a crime have certain
rights that criminal defendants enjoy. These rights might include, in perhaps a modified form,
the right to appear before a magistrate or the right to remain silent. This kind of law would
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narrow the differences in treatment of persons detained as enemy combatants and persons
detained as criminal suspects.

B. Creation of Specialized Laws
Although this article has advocated the creation of specialized laws on terrorism, it
cannot hope to specify the precise content of these specialized laws. What the new laws should
say is a complicated subject that will require long debate and compromise, in Congress, in the
negotiation of international treaties, and elsewhere. Further academic work may provide
guidance in particular areas. But for now, here are four general thoughts regarding various
aspects of the development of specialized laws.
First, lawmakers should base decisions regarding the content of any new specialized
terrorism laws on policy considerations rather than on existing doctrinal categories. In general,
they should seek to determine what rights terrorist suspects ought to have, and what powers
military forces and government agencies should have, based on American values and the
practical needs of the current situation.
For example, in enacting a new law regarding detention of terrorist suspects captured on
the battlefield, Congress should consider as a policy matter how long the military actually needs
to detain them in order to protect national security. It then should devise a rule that will meet
this need while otherwise preserving the value of liberty. The rule need not specify that the
military may hold the suspects for the duration of the conflict simply because the laws of war
permit such detention.274
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By the same token, lawmakers generally should avoid creating antiterrorism rules based
solely on legal precedent. Relying exclusively on precedent generally will not do much to
address the problems, described above,275 that are associated with characterization. For example,
a common form of argument, frequently heard in debates about antiterrorism policy, runs as
follows: "In World War II, the United States lawfully did X to the Nazis because they were
enemy combatants. Terrorists are also enemy combatants. Therefore the law should say that the
United States can do X to terrorists." At present, the United States generally can justify its
actions as a legal matter based on such reasoning,276 but shaping new specialized laws on
precedent may simply replicate the difficulties that reliance on characterization currently is
causing. Congress would do better to consider the needs of the current situation and act
accordingly.
Second, the Constitution may impose some limits on the creation of specialized laws to
regulate governmental responses to terrorism. For example, if the Fourth Amendment requires a
search warrant in a particular situation, then Congress cannot pass a new antiterrorism law
dispensing with the requirement. But this possibility should not preclude all new law
development. Congress could grant additional rights to terrorists who are now classifiable as
enemy combatants and who therefore enjoy limited, if any, protection of the Fourth
Amendment.277 Congress also can alter or change existing statutory rules. For example, at
present, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military from helping civil agencies in searches
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and seizures for the purpose of law enforcement.278 But nothing in the Constitution would
prevent Congress from creating exceptions to this statute.
International treaties also may restrict the United States in reforming its law. For
example, the United Nations Charter imposes limitations on the use of force and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifies requirements for domestic trials.279 The United
States cannot rewrite international treaties by itself. But it may have the options to withdraw
from them, to derogate from their provisions, or to work with other signatories for their
amendment or reinterpretation.
Third, past experience and other factors suggest that the United States in many instances
should expect to lead the way in the creation of the specialized laws on terrorism. The United
States developed individual domestic civil and political rights that subsequent international
human rights agreements, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, later
copied.280 Similarly, the United States' codification of the laws of war in the Lieber Code of
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1863 provided the basis for subsequent international agreements on the subject.281 If the United
States chooses rules wisely, other nations are likely to follow them.
The United States ought to accept most of the burden of drafting and lobbying to bring
into force new international rules regarding terrorism. It should take on these tasks because the
world's other leading democracies simply have less experience and less at stake in dealing with
terrorists outside of their borders. Even in Afghanistan, where allies from twenty nations are
fighting the war against al-Qaida,282 the ultimate responsibility for handling prisoners falls on the
United States. Reported information reveals that besides the United States, only Canada (which
has the second largest contingent of forces in Afghanistan283) has captured appreciable numbers
of suspected terrorists in the country, and Canada turns these suspects over to the United States
for detention and interrogation.284
In fashioning domestically applicable legal rules, the United States can and should draw
from the experiences of other democracies. The United Kingdom, for example, has
experimented with many new specialized legal rules in its efforts to combat terrorism in
Northern Ireland. Israel has done the same with respect to terrorism within its borders. The
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United States may learn from the successes and missteps of these nations, and of other countries
that have confronted the problems posed by terrorism.
Finally, the United States need not create a comprehensive new anti-terrorism legal
regime all at once. This essay has identified difficulties in many different areas of the
antiterrorism law that stem from a reliance on dichotomous characterization to determine the
powers of the government. Congress could improve the law by addressing enacting reforms one
at a time. For example, it might address the subject matter of interrogation first. Then later, it
might tackle detentions or targeted killing. Gradually reforming different areas of the law, in
fact, would reduce the risk that unintended consequences from reform would cause major
problems. New laws regarding military trials, for example, likely would have little effect on the
current proscription against military aid to law enforcement.

C. Consider the Alternatives
The idea of creating specialized laws applicable to terrorism initially may not appeal to
those actively engaged in the ongoing debates about the lawfulness of military responses to
terrorism. Human rights advocates and defense attorneys may fear that new specialized
terrorism laws will provide fewer protections to suspected terrorists than the criminal justice
system currently affords. Similarly, governments using military force to respond to terrorism
may fear that, when dealing with terrorists, any departure from the laws governing armed
conflict may limit their lawful range of action.
Both sides are probably correct if they hold these views. Any new law specifically
addressing terrorism almost certainly will fall somewhere in the middle between the laws of war
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and the rules governing criminal law enforcement. But opponents of the proposal on both sides
should consider the alternative, which is maintaining the status quo.
The current system is dysfunctional for the reasons spelled out in this article.
Governments for the most part dismiss critics who say that the law of war does not apply to
terrorists. The United States, for example, has told pretty much anyone who has objected, that it
will forge ahead with targeted killings, detentions, and military commissions because it views
suspected terrorists as enemy combatants. But despite the steadfastness of the government's
position, its opponents have had an impact. For example, although the President proposed using
military commissions to try suspected terrorists in November 2001, the legal proceedings are
only just beginning four years later. Why is that? Even though human rights groups have not
been able to block the government's plans as a legal matter, they have caused enough commotion
to grind the effort almost to a halt. Examples like this show that neither side really is winning in
the on-going debate.
New laws that establish what governments can and cannot do in combating terrorist
threats, without relying on the characterization of terrorists as criminals or enemy combatants,
hold potential for ameliorating the situation. These new laws would require tradeoffs, but would
provide greater certainty and less controversy. For example, under new laws aimed specifically
at terrorism, the government might lose its ability to hold suspected terrorists indefinitely with no
legislative or judicial oversight. Or it might lose its ability to conduct targeted killing missions at
any time and in any place. But the laws might state clearly when the government might use
military commissions to prosecute suspected terrorists, reducing much of the second guessing
that now inhibits counter-terrorism responses.
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D. An Example of a Specialized Law
Getting away from the current system, which relies on characterization of terrorist suspects as
either enemy combatants or criminals, undoubtedly will prove difficult. Changing the rules in
the middle of a war is worrisome because so much is at stake. But hope for progress does exist.
At least one democratic nation already is taking steps in that direction.
The United Kingdom's "Terrorism Act of 2000" is an example of a specialized law on
terrorism.285 Under the law, the police do not need a warrant to arrest a suspected terrorist.286 In
specified circumstances, they may detain a suspected terrorist for up to 48 hours before allowing
him or her to consult an attorney.287 And they may hold him or her for up to 28 days before
bringing charges.288 But they may not hold suspected terrorists indefinitely without charging
them or giving them access to counsel. In these ways, the Terrorism Act of 2000 gives suspected
terrorist fewer rights than ordinary criminal suspects but more rights than enemy combatants.
Critics might fault the Terrorism Act from both sides. Some may see it as too harsh,
eroding civil liberties that the criminal law ordinarily has afforded.289 Others may see it as too
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soft, depriving the government of some of the powers it needs to combat effectively any enemy
force. In reality, the law reflects a compromise. It sees terrorism not merely as a crime, but not
quite the same as a war against a foreign state. Instead of allowing existing law enforcement
rules or the law of war to determine how the government can treat terrorist suspects, Parliament
has attempted to create a new law that specifically addresses terrorists as terrorists.
Even if other nations disagree with the policy choices that the United Kingdom made, it
seems likely that other nations will follow Parliament's general approach. In areas of detention,
targeted killing, and so forth, they may adopt special laws--through a public political process-that determine how terrorists should be treated.

IV. CONCLUSION
At present, there is a specialized law addressing law enforcement agencies' treatment of
criminal suspects. And there is a specialized law dealing with the military's treatment of enemy
combatants. But with rare exceptions, there are no specialized laws governing military responses
to terrorism. This lack of specialized laws necessitates judging the legality of governmental
responses to terrorism by trying to characterize terrorists either as criminals or belligerents.
The characterization makes a great deal of difference because the laws applicable to
criminal suspects differ a great deal from the laws applicable to enemy combatants. To repeat
the clearest example, the former does not allow targeted killing, while the latter does. The
question thus arises whether this approach produces satisfactory results.

that "provisions in the Terrorism Act contravene UK obligations under international human
rights laws" applicable to criminal suspects).
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This article has argued that it does not. No standard currently exists for correctly
characterizing governmental responses to terrorism. Characterization often produces bad results
from a policy perspective. And governments generally have broad, standardless, and effectively
unreviewable discretion in making characterizations.
A solution to this problem may lie in creating new specialized laws to govern responses
to terrorism. These laws would resemble the law of armed conflict in some respects, but would
borrow from ordinary criminal law procedures in other respects. Creating the law would remove
many doubts about the legality of military responses to terrorism and would allow policy
considerations, rather than the vagaries of characterization, to determine what rules should apply.
Creating specialized laws will take time and it will be difficult. Some will object to
limiting the rights currently enjoyed by criminal suspects, while others will lament the loss of
authority that they believe the armed forces now enjoy. But as explained previously, both sides
might benefit from compromise.
Fortunately, the new laws do not have to emerge all at once. Instead, new standards
might emerge one at a time to regulate particularly important actions like detention or targeted
killing. Already, this approach is occurring in some nations, such as the United Kingdom. They
should continue.
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